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Growing Pains: Using Racketeering Law to Protect
Property Rights from State-Sanctioned Marijuana
Operations
I. Introduction
In June 2018, Oklahoma voters legalized medical marijuana, making it
the thirtieth state to legalize marijuana for either medical or adult
(“recreational”) use.1 Legalization caused a scramble among state
lawmakers and local governments to pass laws and promulgate regulations
to administer this highly debated and often divisive industry.2 Of course,
Oklahoma is not the first state to experience these growing pains, and the
fact that others have gone before might make Oklahoma’s path easier.
Although commentators often focus on marijuana’s impact on the criminal
justice system, medical community, and federal-state government
relations,3 legalization may have an underdiscussed and acute effect on
property owners. For example, imagine a property owner in rural Oklahoma
accustomed to enjoying the simple beauty of its open skies when one fall
morning the distinct “skunk-like” odor from a neighbor’s marijuana harvest
comes sweeping down the plain, settling above this rural oasis. Or, perhaps,
a small diner on the main street in a small community experiences the
congregation of dispensary patrons in front of the diner’s entryway who are
illegally selling recently purchased medical marijuana to non-licensed users
on the diner’s premises. What happens when a neighbor’s state-authorized
marijuana activities interfere with another’s ability to enjoy and use real
1. Tom Angell, Oklahoma Voters Legalize Marijuana for Medical Use, FORBES (June
26, 2018, 10:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/06/26/oklahoma-voterslegalize-marijuana-for-medical-use/#20ab30791374.
2. See OSDH Issues Statement on Passage of State Question 788, OKLA. STATE DEP’T
OF HEALTH OFFICE OF COMMC’NS (June 26, 2018), https://www.ok.gov/triton/
modules/newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=150&article_id=43583; Oklahoma State
Department of Health Working to Implement Medical Marijuana Measure, KFOR.COM
(June 27, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://kfor.com/2018/06/27/oklahoma-state-department-ofhealth-working-to-implement-medical-marijuana-measure/; K. Butcher & Lili Zheng, Gov.
Mary Fallin Signs Controversial Emergency Rules for Medical Marijuana, KFOR.COM (July
11, 2018, 3:07 PM), https://kfor.com/2018/07/11/gov-mary-fallin-signs-emergency-rulesfor-medical-marijuana/; Meg Wingerter, Unanswered Questions Remain as Oklahoma
Medical Marijuana Rolls Out, OKLAHOMAN (Aug. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://
oklahoman.com/article/5603267/unanswered-questions-remain-as-oklahoma-medicalmarijuana-rolls-out.
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Cooperative
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (“The struggle over
marijuana regulation is one of the most important federalism conflicts in a generation.”).
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property? What happens when a state-sanctioned marijuana production
facility or dispensary moves in next door? As Oklahoma’s nascent medical
marijuana industry grows, some property owners may find themselves
struggling to answer such questions.
Oklahomans may find that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Safe Streets
Alliance v. Hickenlooper is a promising tool to address property value
reductions and nuisances created by state-sanctioned marijuana operations.4
In Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of a Colorado case that paired state nuisance law claims with the
federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 5
These doctrines granted the federal court subject matter jurisdiction and
allowed the plaintiffs to target a state-sanctioned marijuana production
operation.6 In spite of characterizing its holding as “narrow,”7 the Tenth
Circuit’s decision subsequently inspired property owners in other
jurisdictions to make similar RICO-based claims against state-sanctioned
marijuana operations.8 While RICO has the potential to be a useful tool for
property owners opposed to state-sanctioned marijuana operations in their
neighborhoods, Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper and its progeny
demonstrate that most property owners likely will not receive favorable
judgments. RICO will not be helpful to most property owners because they
will be unable to prove that state-sanctioned marijuana operations
proximately caused “clear and definite” (not speculative) injuries to their
business or property.9
This Comment explores how property owners have used RICO to
combat state-sanctioned marijuana operations when the marijuana
operations of “Owner A” interfere with the property rights of the rest of the
world. Part II discusses how RICO became a tool for property owners
combatting nuisances caused by state-sanctioned marijuana operations and
what a claimant must do to set the stage for a RICO claim by exploring
nuisance law and state regulations that may eliminate the causes of injury to
4. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 876, 891 (10th Cir. 2017).
5. Id. at 891.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Daniel Murner et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 55 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1619, 1669 (2018) (“The First, Second, Third, and Seventh circuits follow the
rule that a RICO cause of action may not accrue unless the amount of damages is clear and
definite and note speculative. In contrast, the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits hold
that a RICO cause of action is ripe as long as plaintiff’s injury is sufficiently definable and
not speculative.”).
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property. Part III explains the requirements for a RICO claim, with
particular focus on how that framework applies to medical marijuana. Part
IV analyzes cases in Colorado, Oregon, California, and Massachusetts to
demonstrate RICO’s limited utility in combating state-sanctioned marijuana
operations in Oklahoma. Part V discusses how the outcomes of these cases
will likely affect the future of RICO claims against state-sanctioned
marijuana operations and reveals the need for federal action on marijuana
legalization. Part VI concludes by explaining that, while the RICO cases
have not helped aggrieved property owners thus far, an ideally situated
property owner could invoke RICO to recover treble damages for what
normally would be a state-law nuisance claim.
II. Tilling the Soil for a RICO Claim
For RICO to be a useful tool for property owners, a state-sanction
marijuana operation must cause an injury to the property of another.10 Most
complaints about state-sanctioned marijuana operations concern odor.11
Descriptions of marijuana’s pungent odor include phrases such as “skunklike” and lemon-like odors mixed with sulfur.12 Terpenes—molecules found
in the oils of a cannabis plant that repel insects—are responsible for
marijuana’s distinctive odor.13 While terpenes are common in plants
generally, marijuana has a higher concentration of terpenes that makes the
plant more aromatic than others.14 A powerful odor, however, indicates that
marijuana was harvested at its peak and is desirable among producers and
consumers.15 Growing or storing marijuana in large quantities magnifies the
odor and increases the likelihood that neighbors will complain. Further, the

10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See Thomas Fuller, ‘Dead Skunk’ Stench from Marijuana Farms Outrages
Californians, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/
california-marijuana-stink.html.
13. Dan Michaels, Where Does Cannabis’ Smell Come From? Learn About Terpenes,
GREENSTATE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.greenstate.com/explained/what-are-terpenesunderstanding-cannabis-aroma-molecules/.
14. See id. (“Terpenes are common throughout the plant world, and while cannabis can
create about 1,000 of them, we’ve catalogued about 20,000 in nature.”).
15. Bill Daley, Why Is Pot So Stinky?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 20, 2016, 12:42 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-why-pot-smells-0420-20160420-story.html.
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marijuana industry creates waste that may be difficult to dispose of under
state and local regulations.16
State-law nuisance claims generally provide the most direct remedy for
odor-based complaints rather than federal racketeering laws. However,
because of marijuana’s classification as a controlled substance, property
owners may utilize RICO in conjunction with state-law nuisance claims to
gain federal jurisdiction. Even with federal jurisdiction, recovery remains
limited to what is allowed by the state’s nuisance laws.
For an odor-based claim to mature, the marijuana enterprise must operate
in a manner that allows it to interfere with the rights of others.17 As a result,
state and local regulations will influence whether odor-based complaints
may mature. Stricter regulations that limit the amount of marijuana that can
be produced or maintained in a location will reduce the likelihood of odorbased complaints, whereas less stringent regulations that permit larger
accumulations of marijuana in one location increase the likelihood of odorbased complaints. Exploring nuisance laws and the regulatory schemes for
state-sanctioned marijuana operations proves useful in understanding the
outcome of RICO-based litigation.
A. Nuisance Law
If the state-sanctioned marijuana activity of one property owner
interferes with the use and enjoyment of another’s property, the aggrieved
property owner’s counsel would likely look to state nuisance law for
redress before federal racketeering laws. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
identifies three legally significant meanings of a nuisance, which—
generally—distill to conditions or activities that may be harmful or
annoying to others.18
The doctrine of nuisance consists of both public and private nuisances.19
Public nuisance includes “an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.”20 Examples of public nuisances include the
16. See Lester Black, Washington’s Weed Industry Has a Million-Pound Waste
Problem, STRANGER (July 26, 2017), https://www.thestranger.com/weed/2017/07/26/
25307388/washingtons-weed-industry-has-a-million-pound-waste-problem.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (stating RICO requires an injury to business or
property); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[F]or a
nuisance to exist there must be harm to another or the invasion of an interest . . . .”).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A(b); see also 50 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1, 2–21
(2011); 50 OKLA. STAT. § 1.1 (2019), https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/Deliver
Document.asp?CiteID=72104 (effective Nov. 1, 2019).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 821A(a); see also 50 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2–3.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1).
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erection of structures that interfere with passage on public highways; the
use of public spaces like parks or public squares; the navigation of
waterways; or the existence of structures that affect the health, welfare, and
safety of the general public.21 Today, state laws and statutes provide
varying definitions of public nuisance, often without the criminal liability
once associated with its common-law roots.22 An individual plaintiff must
experience a harm that is distinguishable from the general harm
experienced by the public to recover damages for a public nuisance claim.23
In Oklahoma, a property owner must experience a “special injury” to bring
an action based on public nuisance, meaning the injury of which the
plaintiff complains must be in some way different from what other
members of the public suffer.24
A property owner lacking the “special injury” required for a public
nuisance claim, however, may suffer an injury sufficient to assert a private
nuisance claim. A private nuisance exists when there “is a nontrespassory
invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”25 A
private nuisance claim allows the plaintiff to recover for harm to the land,
interference with its enjoyment and use, or harm to the plaintiff’s family
and chattels.26 Private nuisances may include interference with not only the
actual use of land, but also the value of the land or enjoyment associated
with occupying the land.27 Nevertheless, the enjoyment of the land does not
equate with emotional distress, which receives limited protection.28 A
plaintiff may only maintain a private nuisance action if the defendant’s
conduct “interferes with the exercise of the particular rights and privileges
that he owns.”29
Nuisance damages—both public and private—are limited to plaintiffs
suffering “significant harm,” which means harm different than to be
expected from “property in normal condition and used for a normal

21. Id. § 821B cmt. a.
22. Id. § 821B cmts. b–d.
23. Id. § 821C(1).
24. N.C. Corff P’ship, Ltd. v. OXY USA, Inc., 1996 OK CIV APP 92, ¶ 27, 929 P.2d
288, 295.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D.
26. Id. § 821D cmt. a. Oklahoma’s definition of private nuisance is unspecific and
essentially includes those not within the definition of public nuisances. 50 OKLA. STAT. § 3
(2011).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 821E cmt. a.
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purpose.”30 Measuring “significant harm” is an objective standard based on
“the standard of normal persons or property in the particular locality.” 31
Though a hypothetical “hypersensitive” person would be unable to recover
based on events that others would not consider a substantial annoyance or
disturbance,32 courts consider the characteristics of the particular
community when determining whether the activity constitutes a
“substantial” annoyance.33
Complaints against state-sanctioned marijuana operations are likely to
involve private nuisance claims about the odors associated with the
production, storage, and use of marijuana on neighboring properties. Odors
may constitute a nuisance when they pose a risk to public safety and health,
or when they are “merely offensive and unpleasant.”34 Further, smoke may
create an actionable nuisance claim, and precedent may allow for recovery
for cigarette smoke.35 While a “fleeting whiff” of marijuana may not be
offensive, at least one court has found that marijuana odor may become
offensive to a reasonable person depending on the “intensity, duration, or
frequency of the odor.”36
Property owners who pursue nuisance claims against state-sanctioned
marijuana activities often complain about more than a “fleeting whiff.” 37
While there may be little recourse for a property owner whose neighbor’s
recreational or medical marijuana use is annoying on occasion, large-scale
production facilities may produce an odor of sufficient duration, intensity,

30. Id. § 821F.
31. Id. § 821F cmt. d.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 51 (2018).
35. Id. § 49; see, e.g., Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 605 (Ct.
App. 2009) (finding apartment resident sufficiently pleaded public nuisance based on
cigarette smoke so as to withstand demurrer). But cf. DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956,
957–58 (Alaska 2007) (finding there was no error in lower court’s decision that there was no
duty of tenant to refrain from smoking, landlord not liable for trespass, and smoking is not
“ultrahazardous”).
36. State v. Lang, 359 P.3d 349, 351, 355 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (considering probable
cause for disorderly conduct in response to a report about odor of marijuana).
37. See Complaint at 9, Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111 (D. Or. 2018) (No.
6:17-cv-01935-MC) (citing “unmistakable skunk-like stench” and “thick, noxious smoke”);
see also Amanda Chicago Lewis, Inside the High-Tech Solution for Smelly, Smelly Weed,
ROLLING STONE (May 11, 2018, 8:12 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturefeatures/inside-the-high-tech-solution-for-smelly-smelly-weed-630032/ [hereinafter Lewis,
High-Tech Solution].
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and frequency to warrant a nuisance claim.38 For example, the owner of a
5000 square foot marijuana drying facility in Oregon can accommodate up
to 12,000 pounds at a time.39 The owner hired an engineer to design
facilities consistent with the county’s odor-eliminating regulations while
also accommodating large, six-ton shipments and protecting the owner’s
investment.40 Even with these efforts, the owner did not stop the complaints
but has avoided litigation.41
B. State and Local Regulations
In order to satisfy the preconditions for a successful common law claim
for nuisance, state and local regulations must be lenient enough to permit a
marijuana-odor nuisance to develop before a property owner can
successfully use RICO to combat state-sanctioned marijuana operations.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which noted
“enforcement difficulties” in preventing locally cultivated marijuana from
being transferred to other states,42 states have designed regulatory schemes
that prevent state-sanctioned marijuana from entering the stream of
interstate commerce—in hopes of operating without federal interference.43
As a result, states have limited the size and scope of permitted marijuana
operations.44 More stringent laws limit the areas where a state-sanctioned
marijuana producer can operate in a manner that is likely to interfere with
the property rights of neighbors. Comparing states with legalized
38. See Noelle Crombie, Marijuana Odors Bugging You? Annoyed Neighbors Have
Few Options, Officials Say, OREGONIAN (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.oregonlive.com/
marijuana/index.ssf/2015/03/marijuana_odors_bugging_you_re.html (“Smoking in public
remains illegal, but there’s little city officials can do when it comes to marijuana smoke
bothering the neighbors.”); Junnelle Hogen, Pot’s Pungent Odor Causing Quite the Stink,
REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.) (Feb. 25, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.register
guard.com/rg/news/local/34040437-75/as-oregon-pot-grows-proliferate-so-do-complaintsabout-plants-odor.html.csp (“But as Oregon’s legal recreational marijuana program unfolds,
and more growers set up operation, homeowners find they have little recourse against the
stench emitted by pot plants.”); Complaints About Pot Odors on the Rise in Maine,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/2017/11/22/
raising-a-stink/.
39. Lewis, High-Tech Solution, supra note 37.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
43. See Michael Cooper, Safe Streets Alliance & the Tenth Amendment: Intrastate
Cannabis Markets, Interstate Authority & Political Consequences, 18 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
195, 203–04 (2018).
44. Id.
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recreational use—such as Colorado, Oregon, and Washington—to states
maintaining legalized medical marijuana illustrates how regulatory schemes
address the deficiencies the Court identified in Raich as well as how the
regulations may prevent odor-based nuisance claims.
Colorado began experimenting with limited-approval medical marijuana
use in 2000 when the legislature adopted an affirmative defense for
registered patients or caregivers facing possession charges.45 Eventually,
Colorado adopted the first regulatory scheme for the commercial sale of
recreational marijuana in the United States.46 In 2012, Colorado expanded
its legalization of marijuana with Amendment 64 to the Colorado State
Constitution, which decriminalized the possession, production, distribution,
and cultivation of marijuana and related products.47 Amendment 64
authorized local governments to “enact ordinances or regulations . . .
governing the time, place, manner and number of marijuana establishment
operations.”48 Local governments may also ban cultivation and
manufacturing facilities and retail facilities by ordinance, referendum, or
initiative if approved through a general election ballot.49 As a result, local
governments in Colorado have authority to regulate marijuana cultivation,
production, and distribution within their areas of influence.
Oregon transitioned from legalized medical use to recreational use in
2014 with similar restrictions to those adopted in Colorado.50 Oregon
adopted a canopy system for outdoor marijuana grows that limits the size of
production to a maximum of 5000 square feet for outdoor grows and 1250
square feet for indoor grows.51 Also, Oregon regulates homegrown
marijuana by providing its production, possession, and storage must be
hidden from plain view of any public place. Oregon also prohibits
marijuana processors and retailers from establishing operations in
residentially zoned areas.52
45. Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana
Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 147 (2012).
46. Id. at 151.
47. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; see also Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d
865, 876 (10th Cir. 2017).
48. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(f).
49. Id.
50. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475B.005 (West 2018); see also Noelle Crombie,
Recreational Marijuana Sales in Oregon: A Timeline, OREGONIAN (Sep. 30, 2016),
https://www.oregonlive.com/marijuana/index.ssf/2016/09/recreational_marijuana_sales_i.ht
ml.
51. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475B.085(1)(a), 475B.096(2).
52. Id. §§ 475B.090(2)(c), 475B.105(2)(c).
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Oregon intends for its state-based marijuana regulatory scheme to
supersede contradictory municipal charters or local ordinances.53 However,
city or county governments may prohibit licensed marijuana premises by
popular vote.54 By 2018, eighty cities and sixteen counties prohibited
marijuana production, processing, wholesale, and retail activities.55 Local
governments that do not prohibit marijuana activities may impose
“reasonable regulations” that include limitations on production, cost, sale,
hours of business, public access, and premises licensure.56 However,
“reasonable regulations” cannot expand beyond the state-dictated 1000-foot
buffers between retail locations or other limits imposed on agricultural
buildings.57
Like Colorado and Oregon, Washington began experimenting with
medical marijuana58 before legalizing adult, recreational use marijuana in
2012.59 Washington adopted similar rules and regulations to those in
Colorado and Oregon, including buffer zones and other protections.60 Local
governments also have the authority to “make and enforce within [their]
limits all such local police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in
conflict with general laws.”61 The Washington Court of Appeals confirmed
the authority of local governments to enact regulations by holding that the
state did not create an affirmative right to sell marijuana or remove local
governments’ rights to limit marijuana retailers within their jurisdiction.62
Rather than explicitly limiting local governments’ ability to ban marijuana
sales, the legislature incentivized local cooperation through revenue
sharing.63 In Washington, the legalization of recreational marijuana has not

53. Id. § 475B.454 (“The[se] provisions . . . are designed to operate uniformly
throughout the state and are paramount and superior to and fully replace and supersede any
municipal charter amendment or local ordinance inconsistent with the[se] provisions . . . .”).
54. Id. § 475B.461(1).
55. Record of Cities/Counties Prohibiting Licensed Recreational Marijuana Facilities,
OR. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N (rev. Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/
Documents/Cities_Counties_RMJOptOut.pdf.
56. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475B.486(1).
57. Id. §§ 475B.105(2)(d), 475B.109, 475B.486(2).
58. Cannabis Action Coal. v. City of Kent, 322 P.3d 1246, 1249 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App.
2014).
59. Emerald Enters., LLC v. Clark Cty., 413 P.3d 92, 95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
60. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331(8)(a) (West 2019).
61. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
62. Emerald Enters., 413 P.3d at 98.
63. Id. at 101–02 (“This amendment allows counties, cities, and towns to share in the
financial benefits resulting from marijuana retail sales in their jurisdictions.”).
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affected local governments’ ability to regulate the sale of marijuana within
their jurisdictions.64
Washington’s legislation is unique in that it also includes limitations
regarding the presence of marijuana odors in housing units. Washington’s
regulations place limits on the production, processing, and growth of
marijuana to avoid activities from being readily visible or easily smelled
from public or private property.65 This type of limitation on the presence of
marijuana odor may limit many nuisance-based complaints in residential
areas. If local regulations prevent marijuana activities from occurring either
publicly or overtly on a large scale, local regulations will eliminate the
activity before it significantly interferes with the rights of others.
States that have only legalized medical marijuana vary in their legislative
restrictions. Most states impose rigid regulations to control the market,
prevent diversion into other states, and reduce the likelihood of illegal
marijuana sales.66 However, other states take different approaches to how
much authority local governments have to regulate. Two newcomers,
Louisiana and Oklahoma, recently approved medical marijuana and their
respective statutes exemplify the range of local regulation permitted.
Louisiana’s strict production, consumption, and dispensary rules make it
unlikely that local regulation will be necessary. Louisiana prohibits
physicians from recommending smokable marijuana, and limits the medical
conditions that qualify for a prescription.67 Louisiana also limits the
cultivation and production of marijuana to two state university agricultural
centers, which prevents private producers from operating in rural
neighborhoods.68 Further, Louisiana limits the number of pharmacies
licensed to dispense medical marijuana to ten in the entire state and dictates
their placement within nine state regions.69 The Louisiana Pharmacy Board
determines the appropriateness of a pharmacy location based on its
potential to impact religious organizations, schools, charities, hospitals,
military bases, and other institutions.70 Also, the selected pharmacies must
provide documentation “that all applicable state and local building, fire and

64. See id. at 96.
65. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.260(2).
66. Cooper, supra note 43, at 204.
67. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1046 (2018).
68. Id. § 40.1046(H)(2)(a).
69. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 46, § 2445(G) (2019), https://www.doa.la.gov/Pages/osr/LAC46.aspx.
70. Id. § 2447(A)(15)(b)(iii).
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zoning requirements, and local ordinances will be met.”71 These strict
regulations make it unlikely that a RICO claim associated with marijuana
odors interfering with property rights will develop in Louisiana.
Oklahoma’s medical marijuana rules are less rigid than Louisiana’s.
Oklahoma limits possession to three ounces on one’s person, eight ounces
in a residence, and six mature plants in a residence for licensed users. 72
Though licensed growers must meet licensing requirements, the statute
provides “[t]here shall be no limits on how much marijuana a licensed
grower can grow.”73 Licensed processors must follow state requirements
and Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) regulations.74 However,
the statute does not place limitations on odor.75 Like most other states,
Oklahoma includes a 1000-foot buffer zone between retail establishments
and schools.76 However, Oklahoma limits local governments’ ability to
regulate the location of retail marijuana operations. Under the statute, “[n]o
city or local municipality may unduly change or restrict zoning laws to
prevent the opening of a retail marijuana establishment.”77 Shortly after
legalization, this language caused legal challenges in cities that sought to
71. Id. § 2447(A)(6)(c).
72. 63 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 420(A) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2019 of the 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 57th Legis.) (effective Nov. 1, 2019). In 2019 the Oklahoma Legislature
passed the Oklahoma Medical Marijuana and Patient Protection Act (also known as the
Oklahoma Unity Bill) designed to provide clarification and to enact stricter guidelines for
the state’s marijuana program. The Oklahoma Unity Bill did little to address the deficiencies
outlined regarding the limits on production, but the legislation did address concerns about
labeling, testing, and the impact on workplaces. Prior to the passage of the Oklahoma Unity
Bill, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) sought to enact more rigid
administrative rules, but these efforts were unsuccessful and resulted in significant
controversy. See generally Oklahoma Medical Marijuana and Patient Protection Act, H.B.
2612 (Okla. 2019), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/2019-20%20ENR/hB/HB26
12%20ENR.PDF; see also Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Fast-Tracking Medical Marijuana, but
with Pushback, APNEWS (July 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/48f40bdbeefb436abc83c59
dc136b1fe; Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Health Department Revised Medical Marijuana Rules,
APNEWS (July 27, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/44668d69099f497488d540d787ba844e;
Catherine Sweeney, Pharmacy Board Fires Director; Marijuana Working Group Meets, J.
REC. (July 25, 2018), http://journalrecord.com/2018/07/25/pharmacy-board-fires-directormarijuana-working-group-meets/; Lauren Turner, Unity Bill Hits a High Note with
Legislators and Advocates, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://okpolicy.org/unitybill-hits-a-high-note-with-legislators-and-advocates/.
73. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 422(D) (Westlaw).
74. Id. § 423.
75. See id.
76. Id. § 425(G).
77. Id. § 425(F).
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limit retail marijuana operations.78 However, the law is silent on local
governments’ ability to regulate marijuana production or cultivation
facilities. OSDH’s administrative rules require that commercial facilities
meet local construction and safety codes.79 Oklahoma’s medical marijuana
statute and related administrative code do little to protect property owners
from cultivation and processing activities that may constitute nuisances.
Considering the statutory bar on limiting the amount of marijuana a
licensed producer may grow, Oklahoma may well have set the stage for a
landowner to pair state nuisance law and RICO claims to challenge a
neighboring operation that interferes with the use and enjoyment of that
landowner’s property or diminishes the value of the property if he or she
can satisfy all RICO requirements. If Oklahoma approves recreational use
in the future without stricter regulations, the RICO option may be an even
more attractive solution for aggrieved property owners because the
expanded legalization would both increase the number of individuals who
could consume marijuana and expand the market for the drug.
III. Weedkiller: Understanding RICO
Passed in 1970 as part of the federal government’s effort to eradicate
organized crime,80 RICO allows both criminal and civil actions for
engaging in racketeering activities.81 Section 1961 contains an extensive list
of criminal activities, known as predicate acts, that constitute
racketeering.82 The activities encompass almost any conceivable transaction
involved in the growth, transportation, distribution, and sale of any
controlled substance, but RICO’s application is not limited to illegal drug
operations.83 Cases often involve fraud and target both large and small
operations.84 RICO’s private right of action empowers individuals to serve
78. Anna Codutti, As Some Ordinances Shut Out Marijuana Businesses, See How
Oklahoma Cities Are Regulating Patients, Cannabis Industry, TULSA WORLD (July 17,
2019), https://www.tulsaworld.com/photovideo/slideshows/medical-marijuana-ordinancesprompt-lawsuits-how-are-cities-across-oklahoma/collection_b3e65b2c-cbeb-11e8-b5c81356a0c4b59f.html#1.
79. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 310:681-6-2 (West, Westlaw, through rules published in vol.
36, no. 21 of the Oklahoma Register dated July 15, 2019).
80. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1620.
81. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961–1968 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–53).
82. Id. § 1961(1).
83. Id. § 1961(1)(D).
84. E.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply, Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 454–55 (2006) (alleging tax,
mail, and wire fraud in internet tobacco sales scheme); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 (1994) (asserting RICO against anti-abortion groups seeking to
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as “private attorneys general”85 if the individual has been “injured in his
business or property” by the racketeering activities.86
A. Elements of a RICO Claim
When the government employs RICO against a defendant, the
prosecution must prove, under § 1962,87 that a person:
(i) through the commission of two or more acts (ii) constituting a
pattern of racketeering activity (iii) directly or indirectly invested
in, maintained an interest in, or participated in, an enterprise, (iv)
the activities of which affected interstate or foreign commerce.88
Moreover, in a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must prove the elements, an
injury to property or business, and proximate cause.89
Under a RICO action, a “person” is “any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.”90 RICO also requires that
there be a pattern of racketeering activities, meaning at least two prohibited
acts occurred within ten years.91 Further, the acts must be “continuous and
interrelated,” not isolated criminal violations.92 An enterprise under RICO
encompasses a variety of organizations and groups such as corporations,
labor unions, or small groups of individuals associated together for a
common purpose without a formal legal identity.93 Finally, the complainant
must demonstrate the racketeering activity’s impact on interstate or foreign
commerce, but the effect may be indirect or even de minimis.94
Engaging in two separate but unrelated criminal acts is insufficient to
meet the pattern of racketeering activities because RICO requires a pattern
of activity that is “continuous and interrelated.”95 The Supreme Court
articulated a two-prong test for proving a pattern of activity. First, one
prevent women from obtaining abortions); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S.
479, 484 (1985) (alleging mail and wire fraud as predicate acts).
85. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269–70 (1992).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
87. Id. § 1962.
88. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1622.
89. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 881 (10th Cir. 2017).
90. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(3) (Westlaw).
91. Id. § 1961(5).
92. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1625–26.
93. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (Westlaw).
94. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 258 (1994); see also Murner
et al., supra note 9, at 1622, 1637–38.
95. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1625–26.
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“must show that the racketeering predicates are related.”96 Second, they
must “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”97 While
the circuit courts disagree as to how litigants must prove “relationship” and
“continuity,”98 most circuits apply a “two-tiered analysis for the continuity
prong, which focuses on the length of time and number of acts.”99
RICO’s definition of enterprise broadly includes both legal and non-legal
entities,100 public and private organizations, and formal and informal
relationships.101 Informal relationships may constitute associations-in-fact
when participants have “a shared purpose, continuity, and unity.”102 The
enterprises do not have to be business organizations103 and do not require an
economic purpose.104 At a minimum, the association-in-fact requires “a
purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and
longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s
purpose.”105 The broad definition of enterprise has limits and cannot be
applied to municipal corporations, meaning RICO has limited use against
government entities.106
RICO prohibits four classes of activities: receiving or investing income
received, either directly or indirectly, from racketeering activities;107 using
racketeering to acquire an interest in enterprises engaged in “interstate or
foreign commerce;”108 conducting or engaging in, as the enterprise’s affairs
as an employee or individual associated with a racketeering enterprise;109 or
conspiring in any of the above activities.110 Any claim alleging a conspiracy
96. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
97. Id.
98. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1627.
99. Id. at 1628.
100. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-53).
101. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1631–32.
102. Id. at 1632.
103. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 n.2 (2009).
104. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994).
105. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946.
106. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir.
1991) (“The RICO claims against Antelope and District fail because government entities are
incapable of forming a malicious intent.”) (citing Biondolillo v. Sunrise, 736 F. Supp. 258,
260–61 (S.D. Fla. 1990); N. Star Contracting Corp. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 723 F. Supp.
902, 907-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Citisource, Inc. Securities Litig., 664 F. Supp. 1069,
1080–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Massey v. Okla. City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla. 1986)).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2012).
108. Id. § 1962(b).
109. Id. § 1962(c).
110. Id. § 1962(d).
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in violation of § 1962(d) requires proving the elements of another § 1962
violation.111 While RICO readily applies to individuals directly engaged in
the operations of a criminal enterprise, the fact that RICO includes claims
against individuals who participate in activities that support a prohibited
activity may open the way for stacking additional charges against
defendants.
B. Civil Remedies and the Proximate Cause Requirement
Section 1964 outlines the civil remedies available under RICO. 112
Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to order appropriate
remedies, which may include divesting participants’ interests in the
enterprise, reasonably restricting future activities, or dissolving the
enterprise.113 RICO authorizes both the U.S. Attorney General114 and
private individuals to seek these civil remedies.115 However, the private
individual must have been “injured in his business or property” by a § 1962
violation.116 If the private individual succeeds, she recovers triple damages,
costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.117 Civil action does not require a prior
criminal prosecution or conviction of the members of the criminal
enterprise, 118 meaning a property owner can bring a claim against a statesanctioned marijuana operation even without a federal, criminal
prosecution. A preponderance of evidence standard applies to civil RICO
claims rather than the more stringent standard of reasonable doubt applied
in the criminal context, which reduces the burden on civil plaintiffs.119
A simplistic reading of RICO creates the impression that proving the
elements of a RICO claim only requires proving that the marijuana
operation violated the statute by engaging in racketeering activity and that
activity injured property. However, the Supreme Court rejected such a
111. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (“By its terms, § 1962(d)
requires that a plaintiff must first allege an independent violation of subsections (a), (b), or
(c), in order to plead a conspiracy claim under subsection (d).”); see also BancOklahoma
Mortg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 1089, 1103 (10th Cir. 1999).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012).
113. Id. § 1964(a).
114. Id. § 1964(b)
115. Id. § 1964(c).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
119. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] civil
RICO plaintiff must prove his case only by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 531–32 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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simple interpretation of RICO in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection
Corp.120
In Holmes, the Supreme Court considered a securities-fraud RICO claim,
pursued by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, alleging a
conspiracy to manipulate stocks.121 Looking to the language of § 1964(c)
regarding an injury to business or property, the Court noted RICO’s
language could “be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured ‘by reason of’ a
RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the
defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant’s
violation was a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury.”122
The Court rejected this simplistic reading for not being the “compelled”
construction based on legislative intent and statutory history.123 Congress’s
heavy reliance on the Sherman Act in formulating RICO influenced the
adopted construction.124 Adopting the language from the Sherman Act
showed Congress intended to adopt the Act’s contemporary judicial
interpretations, also later used in the Clayton Act, that rejected simplistic
interpretation and incorporated common-law proximate cause principles.125
Thus, the RICO civil claims require proximate cause.126
Holmes identified three reasons why proximate cause is critical to RICO
private action.127 First, less direct injuries make it more difficult to
determine the degree to which the plaintiff’s damages are “attributable to
the [stated] violation” rather than independent factors.128 Second, the Court
sought to avoid “complicated rules” that would be required to allocate
damages among various defendants, which may be voluminous or lead to
“multiple recoveries.”129 Third, the Court articulated the following:
[T]he need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified
by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since
directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

503 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1992).
Id. at 262.
Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267–68.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 269.
Id.
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the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems
attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.130
In addition to proving proximate cause, the property owner must prove
injury to property or business.131 Proving injury to business or property can
be tricky because the losses must be concrete rather than speculative.132
Further, RICO does not provide recovery for personal injuries.133 Federal
courts rely on state law definitions of injury to property, which further
complicates matters.134 Some states, such as Oregon, include claims about
diminished use and enjoyment of property within the definition of personal
injury135 while others, like Colorado, incorporate use and enjoyment within
the definition of injury to property.136 The reliance on state-law definitions
for injury to property influences circuit precedent as well resulting in
different types of injuries being recoverable in different circuits.137 This
means property owners targeting state-sanctioned marijuana operations
must look to their state law definitions of personal injury and injury to
property before bringing a claim about the diminished use and enjoyment of
their property under RICO.
Jurisdictions consistently recognize diminished property values as
injuries to property although some jurisdictions may require that a property
owner either attempt to monetize the interest or at least express a desire to
monetize such an interest by either attempting to sell or lease the affected
property.138 Leaseholders face additional challenges in alleging injury to

130. Id. at 269–70.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
132. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc),
abrogated by Boar, Inc. v. Cty. of Nye, 499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012).
133. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 885 (10th Cir. 2017).
134. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005).
135. See Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1122 (D. Or. 2018) (“A
defendant’s interference with a possessor’s ‘comfort and enjoyment’ of her property is a
‘personal injury’. . . .”).
136. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 886.
137. See Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1122–23 (noting distinction between Oregon and
Colorado law and impact on decisions in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits); see also
Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 886 (“But Colorado also has long recognized that invasion of
one’s property by noxious odors itself gives rise to a nuisance claim and is a direct injury to
property.”).
138. Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1124–25; see Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 887; Oscar v.
Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), abrogated by
Boar, Inc. v. Cty. Of Nye, 499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012).
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property if the claim is based on diminution of value.139 The Ninth Circuit
previously noted that a diminished resale value does not affect a leaseholder
because the leaseholder could gain from such a circumstance because a
significant downturn in value would reduce the amount of rent expected of
the leaseholder.140
While proving injury to property presents challenges depending on the
state law and circuit precedent, an informed property owner can tailor
pleadings to meet the requirements needed to sufficiently plead a RICO
injury to property or business. Establishing proximate cause will be key to
success in a RICO-based complaint because the property owner not only
has to prove that there was an injury to property or business but also that
the criminal activity caused that injury. Property owners must keep both the
elements of RICO and the practical difficulties of substantiating property
damage in mind when bringing a RICO claim against a state-sanctioned
marijuana operation in court.
IV. The Initial Crop of RICO Cases
When Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing returned to
the District Court of Colorado on remand, other property owners and their
attorneys took notice, and filed similar suits in federal courts in Oregon,
California, and Massachusetts.141 These claims, including those in Safe
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, have proven
unsuccessful thus far. Nevertheless, property owners in early cases had
some success using RICO to either reach a settlement or to terminate the
marijuana operation.142
A. Cultivating Claims in Colorado
Colorado was a trailblazer in recreational marijuana legalization and in
the use of RICO to combat state-sanctioned marijuana operations. Parties
brought two separate RICO claims in February 2015 in the District Court of
Colorado: Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies143 and
139. Oscar, 965 F.2d at 786–87.
140. Id.
141. See Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.
Mass. 2018); Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1115–16; Quillinan v. Ainsworth, No. 4:17-cv00077-KAW, 2018 WL 2151936, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018).
142. Court Docket, McCart v. Beddow, No. 3:17-cv-00927-AC (D. Or. Jan. 1, 2018)
(referencing a Court Minute dictating that the parties settled and staying the case).
143. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Med. Marijuana of the Rockies, LLC, No. 1:15-cv00350-MSK (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2015).
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Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC.144 A Washington
D.C.-based non-profit organization, the Safe Streets Alliance145 (the
Alliance), was a plaintiff in both cases and filed suit in federal court.146 The
group joined with individual property and business owners to target
individual marijuana producers.147 Though a former Justice Department
official served as chair of the Alliance and a D.C.-based law firm
represented the Alliance,148 the number and identity of its membership
remains largely unknown.149
Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies involved a
hotel seeking to prevent a marijuana dispensary from operating nearby in
Frisco, Colorado.150 The complaint asserts that “marijuana businesses [are]
bad neighbors” that discourage legitimate customers while attracting bad
ones, create traffic disruptions, depreciate property values, and smell bad.151
The defendants included not only the marijuana operation and its owner,
but also the property owner who agreed to sell and lease the property to the
marijuana operation; individual investors; the construction contractor; the
Bank of the West, which provided banking services; a bond company; and
the operation’s accountant.152 The court quickly dismissed the bank, which
reported that it was not aware that the defendants participated in the
marijuana industry.153 In June 2015, the court voluntarily dismissed the
144. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REBCBS (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5007944.
145. Ricardo Baca, Who Exactly Is Behind the Lawsuits over Colorado’s Legal
Marijuana?, DENVER POST (Jan. 15, 2016, 10:56 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/
01/15/who-exactly-is-behind-the-lawsuits-over-colorados-legal-marijuana/?clearUserState=
true.
146. John Ingold, Jury Finds in Favor of Colorado Marijuana Grow in Closely Watched
Federal Lawsuit, COLO. SUN (Oct. 31, 2018, 4:55 PM MDT), https://coloradosun.com/
2018/10/31/colorado-safe-streets-rico-lawsuit-verdict/.
147. See, e.g., Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 876–77 (10th Cir. 2017).
148. Baca, supra note 145.
149. See id.; see also Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 879.
150. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REBCBS (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5007944.
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id. at 5–6.
153. Ricardo Baca, Anti-Pot Racketeering Suit Settles, Opens Door for Future RICO
Claims, DENVER POST (Dec. 30, 2015, 10:48 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/12/30/
anti-pot-racketeering-suit-settles-opens-door-for-future-rico-claims/ (“One defendant, Bank
of the West, was dropped from the lawsuit in February after it closed all bank accounts
belonging to Medical Marijuana of the Rockies . . . and denied that it knew the nature of
[the] business.”).
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Alliance from Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies.154
In December 2015, the hotel settled with the marijuana operation, which
had closed its existing operation due to the litigation, as well as with other
defendants.155 The case’s short lifespan makes it difficult to identify many
lessons-learned. Initially, a RICO lawsuit appeared to give property owners
opposed to state-sanctioned marijuana operations leverage to push
settlement, terminate the marijuana operation, or both. The expense of
litigation and the stigma of being characterized as a criminal enterprise in
court were powerful deterrents to marijuana operators.
Unlike Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies, the
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC plaintiffs refused
to settle and inspired other RICO-based claims.156 In Safe Streets Alliance v.
Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, the Alliance joined with rural property
owners, the Reillys,157 who, at the time they filed the lawsuit, used property
that they owned in a rural development for riding horses and other
recreational activities.158 A marijuana operation opened on a neighboring
lot, and the Reillys alleged that the marijuana operation and its “noxious
odors” harmed their property in two ways.159 First, operating an open drug
conspiracy in the neighborhood affected property values, which constitutes
an injury to property under RICO, and second, the odors from marijuana
production interfered with the use and enjoyment of the property.160 In
addition to the RICO claim, Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic
Healing, LLC, included an equity claim against the State of Colorado using
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution as a preemptive
force to combat the state’s marijuana legalization regime.161 The District
Court of Colorado initially dismissed the complaint because the Reillys had
not sufficiently pleaded injury to property proximately caused by the
marijuana operation’s violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).162
154. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff Safe Streets, Safe Sts. All. v. Med.
Marijuana of the Rockies, LLC, No. 15-cv-00350-MSK-MJW (D. Colo. June 15, 2015).
155. Baca, supra note 145.
156. See Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 879 (10th Cir. 2017).
157. Id.
158. Id. The Reillys later built a home on the property, which may have affected the
jury’s verdict. Kathleen Foody & Associated Press, Lawsuit over Pot, Property Values
Could Have Broad Impacts, DENVER POST (Oct. 28, 2018, 12:00 pm),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/10/28/denver-marijuana-property-tax-lawsuit/.
159. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 879–80.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 876–77.
162. Id. at 880–81.
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Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the equity claim in Safe
Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, the court remanded the RICO claim
because “the landowners [had] plausibly alleged at least one § 1964(c)
claim against each of [the] defendants.”163
On remand, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion provided guidance for the
District Court of Colorado. First, the Tenth Circuit established that the
marijuana operation was engaged in an activity that would be indictable
under the CSA and therefore satisfied RICO’s definition of racketeering
activity.164 Second, the Reillys sufficiently pleaded a shared “purpose,
relationship, and longevity” and proved an “association-in-fact” enterprise
existed under RICO.165 Third, the Tenth Circuit noted that the “cultivating,
distributing, and selling” involved in the enterprise “undisputedly affects
interstate commerce.”166 Further, the defendants, who admitted that they
agreed to engage in activities to produce marijuana for sale, met RICO’s
requirement that the individuals be engaged in the operation and
management of the enterprise.167 Fourth, the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a
pattern of activity “that present[ed] a threat of ongoing criminal activity.” 168
Finally, the landowners sufficiently pleaded that the neighboring criminal
enterprise and its odor interfered with their rights to use and enjoy as well
as their property values, meaning the claim could proceed.169
Equipped with the Tenth Circuit’s guidance, the district court granted
summary judgment on the § 1962(c) claim in Safe Streets Alliance v.
Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC.170 No genuine issue of material fact
existed: the defendants were engaged unlawfully in an enterprise that
affected interstate commerce and constituted a pattern of racketeering
activity.171 In his decision, the district judge averred the landowners had to
prove (1) violation of § 1962, (2) injury to business or property, and (3)
causation.172 With regard to the § 1962 violation, the defendants only
163. Id. at 877.
164. Id. at 882 (“It follows, therefore, that operating a marijuana cultivation facility of
the type . . . described . . . necessarily would involve some racketeering activity.”).
165. Id. at 883.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 884.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 886–87.
170. Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 15-cv-00349-REB-SKC, 2018 WL
3861156, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2018).
171. See Order Re: Summary Judgment Motions at 15–16, Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC,
No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2018).
172. Id. at 4.
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challenged that a RICO enterprise existed.173 The remaining defendant
controlled two limited liability companies (6480 Pickney, LLC and Camp
Feel Good, LLC) that produced the marijuana for resale on the land
neighboring the Reillys’ property.174 Claiming 6480 Pickney, LLC was an
“alter ego,” the defendant denied that an enterprise existed.175 This
argument was irrelevant, according to the district judge, because of the
Tenth Circuit’s finding that an enterprise existed.176 The Tenth Circuit’s
decision, as well as Raich, required the district court to find that the effect
on interstate commerce existed.177 In addition, the district court also found
that growing marijuana for sale is racketeering activity under RICO. 178 The
district court asserted that “[e]ach act of cultivation and sale constitutes a
separate violation of the CSA and therefore a predicate RICO offense.”179
Genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to injury to business
or property and causation.180 The judge characterized the defendants’
evidence regarding improved value as being “somewhat thin” but believed
it was a question for the jury.181 While the plaintiffs alleged the value of
their property decreased due to the marijuana operation, the defendants
alleged the opposite—proximity to the production increased the value of the
land.182
As Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC moved to a
jury trial, the parties wrangled over experts.183 The plaintiffs presented a
real estate professor whose meta-analysis and review of relevant literature
resulted in an estimate that the Reillys’ property depreciated around
$24,000.184 The defense objected to the plaintiffs’ expert witness, but the
court rejected the defendant’s motion, admonishing it as “long on argument,

173. Id.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Id. at 7–8.
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 12–14. The judge had harsh words for the defense’s effort to “correct” the
testimony of its expert by using an errata sheet based on an assertion that the expert had been
unable to qualify a statement regarding the value of the land being offset by the abovemarket price paid by the plaintiffs for their property. Id.
183. Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 15-cv-00349-REB-SKC, 2018 WL
3861156, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2018).
184. Id.
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but woefully short on authority or analysis.”185 Under the evidence rules,
the court stated that even a landowner without skilled training could be
considered a “skilled witness.”186 Further, the court denied the motion to
disqualify and also denied the request for the court to appoint an expert.187
Before trial, the plaintiffs opposed the defense’s use of county tax
documents that showed plaintiff’s property had increased in value after the
defendants began their marijuana production because the assessor did not
account for changes in property use on adjacent lots.188
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC demonstrates
that experts are critical to the outcome of a RICO claim that alleges injury
caused by state-sanctioned marijuana operations. Under RICO, injury to
property “requires proof of concrete financial loss”189 as Congress did not
intend “to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to every tort
plaintiff.”190 While the Federal Rules of Evidence may consider a
landowner a “skilled witness” when it comes to valuing property,191 a jury
will likely want more than the property owner’s assessment. Ultimately, the
Reillys failed to convince the jury that the state-sanctioned marijuana
production sufficiently injured their property.192 In Safe Streets Alliance v.
Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, the defendants ultimately scored a
victory for state-sanctioned marijuana producers although that outcome
seemed uncertain when the case first appeared. Initially the litigation
caused distress among marijuana producers.193 The Reillys’ failure in Safe
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC allayed fears because
it now appears that proving a RICO case may be too difficult for many

185. Id. at *2.
186. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendments.
187. Alt. Holistic Healing, 2018 WL 3861156, at *4.
188. Plaintiff’s Pretrial Brief at 2, Reilly v. 6480 Pickney, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349REB-SKC (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2018).
189. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc),
abrogated by Boar, Inc. v. Cty. of Nye, 499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012).
190. Id. at 786.
191. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes to 1972 amendments; Alt. Holistic
Healing, LLC, 2018 WL 3861156, at *2.
192. Final Judgment at 1, Reilly v. 6480 Pickney, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC
(D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2018).
193. See Amanda Chicago Lewis, How Anti-Mafia Laws Could Bring Down Legal Pot,
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 28, 2017, 3:08 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture
-features/how-anti-mafia-laws-could-bring-down-legal-pot-206233/ [hereinafter Lewis, AntiMafia Laws].
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property owners.194 The outcome informs what may occur in other RICObased claims; however, the outcome does not preclude all similar claims.
B. Spreading Seeds in Oregon
On June 13, 2017, six days after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Safe
Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, an attorney who owned property affected
by a state-sanctioned marijuana operation in Oregon, withdrew a nuisancebased state court claim and filed a RICO claim in federal district court.195 In
McCart v. Beddow, the plaintiffs sued the owners and tenants on a
neighboring property, three limited liability companies associated with the
property, operators of retail marijuana facilities who purchased marijuana
from the neighboring property, and the Bank of America, which held a
mortgage on the neighboring property.196 The aggrieved landowners
asserted many misdeeds by the parties, including damage to easements
caused by increased traffic in the neighborhood, trespass and harassment,
the creation of the “powerful and unmistakable skunk-like stench of
marijuana” that prevented the landowners from using and enjoying the
outdoor areas of their home, and the presence of guard dogs that interfered
with the landowners’ horses.197 In addition to interfering with the use and
enjoyment of the property, the landowners alleged the marijuana operation
adversely impacted the value of the property because the illegal activities
next door would scare away potential buyers.198 The landowners asserted
twenty-three claims against the various defendants under either subsection
1962(c), (d), or both.199 In January 2018, the landowners settled the suit.200
The quick resolution of McCart provided little opportunity for the court to
apply the law and showed the power of RICO litigation to force either
settlement or termination of the enterprise. Like in Safe Streets Alliance v.
Medical Marijuana of the Rockies, the defendant-marijuana producers in
McCart likely sought settlement to avoid the cost of extended litigation and

194. See Paul Elias, Colorado Jury’s Pot Verdict May Discourage Similar Property
Value Lawsuits Against Cannabis Companies, DENVER POST (Nov. 1, 2018, 10:32 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/11/01/colorado-pot-grower-property-value-lawsuit/.
195. Complaint at 1–2, McCart v. Beddow, No. 3:17-cv-00927-AC (D. Or. June 13,
2017).
196. Id. at 3–8.
197. Id. at 27–28.
198. Id. at 30–31.
199. Id. at 31–61.
200. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i),
McCart, No 3:17-cv-00927-AC (D. Or. Jan. 24, 2018).
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the stigma of being characterized as a criminal enterprise that was engaged
in racketeering activity.201
In December 2017, a group of property owners in Butte Creek Estates, a
rural, Oregon neighborhood, filed the second case in Oregon, Ainsworth v.
Owenby. A nearby marijuana production allegedly damaged the properties
in Butte Creek Estates in violation of RICO and state private nuisance
laws.202 The defendants included the Owenbys, who owned the property
where the marijuana enterprise operated; other individuals who participated
in the operation of the enterprise; and the mortgage company.203 A “skunklike stench” allegedly pervaded over the neighborhood due to the operators
burning “marijuana debris” and running exhaust fans in a greenhouse.204
Due to the operation, traffic increased on the dead-end streets in the
neighborhood turning the roads “into busy, and at times unsafe, commercial
roadways.”205 Butte Creek Estates residents complained of a grass fire
started by the marijuana production, the presence of guard dogs, increased
traffic, and reports of prowling and break-ins.206
Due to the drug trafficking in the neighborhood, Butte Creek Estates
residents formed a neighborhood watch, purchased security equipment,
installed new fencing, and acquired firearms.207 Because “dream” homes
usually do not involve illegal drug manufacturing, loud noises, and awful
odors, the marijuana production allegedly adversely affected property
values in the neighborhood.208 Further, the residential zoning prevented the
neighborhood from being attractive to other marijuana producers because
local ordinances prohibited marijuana production in those zones.209 The
private nuisance claim alleged that the defendants’ property was in a “rural
residential” area, the production violated local ordinances, and the
operation did not fall within the state’s “right to farm” laws.210 Other
201. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985) (“[A] civil RICO
proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a number of other civil proceedings.”). The
Supreme Court has discounted the stigma that the label of racketeer may have noting that a
RICO claim is no more stigmatizing than any other civil proceeding. However, media
coverage of Hickenlooper indicates otherwise. See Lewis, Anti-Mafia Laws, supra note 193.
202. Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1115–16 (D. Or. 2018).
203. Id. at 1116–17, 1116 n.2.
204. Complaint at 9, Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111 (No. 6:17-cv-01935-MC).
205. Id. at 10.
206. Id. at 15–16.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id. at 17.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 30.
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complaints alleged the property owners suffered from physical ailments
such as headaches and coughs.211
In August 2018, the court dismissed the RICO claim without prejudice
“because Plaintiffs fail[ed] to allege a compensable property injury under
the civil RICO statute,”212 although the court allowed the Butte Creek
Estates residents to amend their complaint.213 The court noted that to
establish standing, the plaintiff must show an “injury-in-fact” that is “‘fairly
traceable’” to the actions of the defendant that is “likely to be ‘redressed by
a favorable decision.’”214 The Butte Creek Estates residents alleged three
injuries including diminished property values, loss of use and enjoyment,
and expenses related to security equipment, fencing, and firearms. 215
Because they had ceased marijuana production on the property, the
marijuana operators alleged the Butte Creek Estates residents could no
longer claim the first two injuries. Further, reimbursement for enhanced
security measures like security systems and firearms were not injuries to
business or property, meaning the expenditures were not compensable
under RICO.216
Absence of an allegation of a compensable injury, not a lack of
constitutional standing, led to the dismissal without prejudice and leave to
amend in August 2018.217 Constitutional standing existed under RICO
because of “a cognizable injury-in-fact” arising from “the lost use and
enjoyment of their properties.”218 Further, the plaintiffs had standing for
past interferences due by smoke, noise, and odor in Butte Creek Estates.219
However, the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing because the “impaired use
and enjoyment of . . . land is a non-compensable personal injury.”220

211. Id. at 30–31.
212. Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1116 (D. Or. 2018).
213. Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 6:17-CV-01935-MC, 2019 WL 1387681, at *1 (D. Or.
Mar. 27, 2019).
214. Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992)).
215. Id.
216. Id. The Ninth Circuit previously left open the possibility that expenditures for
security systems might satisfy the financial loss requirement. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop.
Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), abrogated by Boar, Inc. v. Cty. of Nye,
499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012).
217. Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 6:17-CV-01935-MC, 2019 WL 1387681, at *1 (D. Or.
Mar. 27, 2019).
218. Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1119.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1122.
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In Ainsworth, the injury was non-compensable because federal courts
rely on state law to define “property,” and Oregon distinguishes between
injuries to property and personal injuries in nuisance claims. 221 Oregon
considers interference with one’s rights to use and enjoy property to be a
personal injury, but decreased value or physical damage to property is
considered to be an injury to property.222 This reasoning transferred to the
federal court because the Ninth Circuit had adopted a similar distinction.223
The court stated that although the claims brought by the plaintiffs in
Ainsworth, were “actionable under Oregon nuisance law, such harms to
human comfort [were] not compensable under RICO.”224
Butte Creek Estates residents’ claims differed from those in Safe Streets
Alliance v. Hickenlooper because the Tenth Circuit relied on Colorado law
that did not distinguish between personal and property injury.225 Both
Oregon law and Ninth Circuit precedent bound the Ainsworth court.226 The
Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test to determine if a plaintiff plausibly
alleged an injury to property.227 “First, the alleged injury must be to a
recognized property interest,” rather than a purely personal or emotional
injury.228 Second, there must be a “concrete financial loss.”229 In Ainsworth,
the initial complaint lacked this type of loss.
The court’s statements regarding security equipment fencing, and camera
expenses describe how many property owners likely view proximity to a
state-sanctioned marijuana operation.
Plaintiffs in the present case cannot transform their apprehension
of third-party prowlers into a compensable RICO injury simply
by reaching for their wallets. Stated differently, it is not enough
that Plaintiffs have alleged concrete financial losses because
those losses are derivative of their emotional distress and not a
property interest recognized under Oregon law—the financial

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1123.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1121.
228. Id. (citing Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
229. Id. (quoting Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc)).
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loss is necessary but not sufficient to state a cognizable RICO
claim.230
As a result, the landowners’ RICO claim hinged on the loss in value of
the property, and the court noted plaintiffs needed to include either efforts
to monetize their property interest such as by sale or, at a minimum, the
intent to do so.231 The court again looked to the Ninth Circuit and its
treatment of speculative losses as a result of diminished value of
property.232 While the Ninth Circuit has eased its requirements for concrete
loss, the circuit still requires pleading the intent to monetize or failed efforts
to monetize in order to establish a tangible loss.233 The Butte Creek Estates
residents plaintiffs did not wish to sell or lease their lands, which left only
an “abstract harm” based on a reasonable inference that the property values
had decreased.234 To establish a reasonable inference, property owners do
not have to have complicated statistics or expensive appraisals, but they had
to provide more than just their own assertions that their property values had
decreased.235 In the Ninth Circuit, property owners need to show attempts
or desires to “convert . . . interests into a pecuniary form.“236
Demanding either efforts or the desire to monetize interest provides
another distinction between the Ainsworth case and Safe Streets Alliance v.
Hickenlooper. While the Ninth Circuit precedent did not bind the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, the two circuits
approach proximate cause in a similar manner.237 The Oregon District Court
found the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of proximate cause in Safe Streets
Alliance v. Hickenlooper to be both persuasive and consistent with the
Ninth Circuit’s three-factor test.238
On September 28, 2018, Butte Creek Estates residents filed an amended
complaint in an attempt to remedy the deficiencies in the alleged injuries.239
This time, the complaint included an unfavorable home appraisal obtained
when one of the Butte Creek Estates residents sought a home-equity loan to
230. Id. at 1124.
231. Id. at 1125.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1126.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 1127.
238. Id. at 1127–28.
239. See First Amended Complaint at 1, Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 6:17-cv-01935-MC
(D. Or. Sept. 28, 2018).
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finance a new fence the property owner was building in response to the
marijuana operation.240 The home’s decreased value led to a smaller loan
being available, and the property owners using a less secure and less
attractive fencing than they desired.241 The amended complaint also
included enhanced allegations of trespass by the marijuana enterprise and
its animals.242 Further, the amended complaint detailed incidents of
harassment and intimidation, including slashed tires, allegedly caused by
the marijuana producers or their associates.243 In March 2019 the district
court dismissed for failure to state a claim finding that the inability to
secure a higher home equity loan due to a lower home value was not a
compensable injury to property under Oregon law.244 Rather than suffering
a concrete financial loss, the depressed home valuation prevented the home
owner from acquiring greater debt.245 Further, the homeowner did not allege
that the neighboring marijuana enterprise resulted in banks demanding
higher interest rates or other unfavorable terms.246 As a result, Oregon
seems to be an unlikely jurisdiction for a RICO claim to succeed largely in
part to Oregon’s distinction between personal injury and property injury.
C. Blowing Smoke in California
Two cases in California further illustrate the challenges facing plaintiffs
using RICO to target state-sanctioned marijuana operations. In 2017,
antiques dealers, appearing pro se, filed suit in the Northern District of
California asserting five claims under RICO and another federal claim
alleging that more than sixty defendants engaged in criminal enterprises for
the purpose of cultivating and distributing marijuana.247 In Quillinan v.
Ainsworth, antique dealers rented storage space in a commercial
warehouse.248 When a marijuana operation purchased the warehouse, the
new owners gave the antiques dealers thirty days’ notice to vacate.249
Unable to obtain an adequate, alternative storage facility, the antiques
240. Id. at 13.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 12.
243. Id. at 20–21.
244. Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 6-17-cv-01935-MC, 2019 WL 1387681, at *1–2 (D. Or.
Mar. 27, 2019).
245. Id. at *2.
246. Id.
247. Quillinan v. Ainsworth, No. 4:17-cv-00077-KAW, 2018 WL 2151936, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. May 10, 2018).
248. Id. at *2.
249. Id.
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dealers had to sell or dispose of property and relocate to less desirable
facilities.250 The antiques dealers argued the purchase of the storage
warehouse was the result of racketeering activity associated with marijuana
cultivation and distribution.251
The district court dismissed the initial complaint, but the Ninth Circuit,
reversed and remanded.252 On remand, the district court “dismiss[ed]
without leave to amend, because any amendment would be futile.”253 The
court determined that the antiques dealers lacked standing because the
termination of the lease was legal and did “not become a criminal act purely
based upon the nature of the business or entity that does it.”254 The court
distinguished Quillinan from Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper because
the antiques dealers did not experience a nuisance caused by the marijuana
operation’s odor or a reduced property value.255 The marijuana enterprise
did not cause the antique dealers’ inability to obtain affordable alternative
storage.256 Rather, the lost lease caused the injury, and any new owner
could have terminated the lease, meaning this was not an injury caused by
criminal activity.257 The antiques dealers appealed the dismissal to the
Ninth Circuit; however, the court dismissed the appeal due to appellant’s
failure to respond to a court order.258
Quillinan is distinguishable from the other RICO cases that were
inspired by Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper. First, the antiques dealer
in Quillinan did not allege interference with the use and enjoyment or value
of property due to marijuana odors. Rather, the antiques dealers alleged that
a marijuana enterprise caused them to lose profits when they had to sell
inventory at reduced prices. Second, the antiques dealers were not the
owners of the affected warehouse but had a possessory interest per a lease
and alleged an injury to their business. As a result, the antiques dealers
failed to sufficiently plead the required injury to property or business.259
In 2018 four families in Sonoma County, California, filed suit alleging
that an unlicensed marijuana operation caused injury to their neighboring
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
2018).
259.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Quillinan v. Ainsworth, No. 18-16197, 2018 WL 4676696, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 24,
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
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properties.260 In Bokaie v. Green Earth Coffee, LLC, the complaint included
familiar statements about the pervasive “skunk-like” odor of marijuana in
the area.261 However, the injuries claimed included medical complications
associated with asthma, disrupted sleep, and increased “cleaning, medical,
legal, and other expenses.”262 Lastly, the four families in Bokaie alleged that
the criminal enterprise in the neighborhood had negatively affected their
property values.263
Unsurprisingly, the court established the existence of a racketeering
enterprise and the elements of a RICO violation.264 The court determined
that “[b]y definition, growing or dealing in cannabis constitutes
racketeering.”265 Despite this finding, Bokaie and Ainsworth had similar
deficiencies. Like discussed previously in Ainsworth, the neighboring
landowners in Bokaie failed to prove injury to their property or business.266
The four families in Bokaie alleged personal injuries, like medical
expenses, that are not permitted by Ninth Circuit precedent or California
law.267 Further, the four families’ claim of diminished value failed under
California law, which limits recovery for diminution of value in
circumstances with continuing nuisances to avoid double recovery.268 In
Bokaie, the nuisance abated when the marijuana operation ceased
operations.269 In December 2018, the court dismissed the RICO claim
without prejudice, allowing the parties to amend.270 Even if the plaintiffs
had revised their complaint, any amendment probably would not remedy
the flaws inherent in the claim in Bokaie, as the plaintiffs cannot recover for
personal injuries, and the defunct marijuana operation was no longer
affecting their property values. These inherent flaws likely motivated the
four families filing notices of voluntary dismissal with prejudice in January
2019.271
260. Bokaie v. Green Earth Coffee, LLC, No. 18-cv-05244-JST, 2018 WL 6813212, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2018).
261. Id. at *2.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at *4.
265. Id.
266. Id. at *5.
267. Id.
268. Id. at *6.
269. Id.
270. Id. at *7.
271. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 2, Bokaie, No. 3:18-cv-05244-JST
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2019).
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D. Abandoning the Crop in Massachusetts
Though Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper appeared to encourage the
plaintiffs in a Massachusetts case, Crimson Galeria v. Healthy Pharms,
Inc.,272 to file a RICO-based claim, the jury verdict in Safe Streets Alliance
v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC in October 2018 likely discouraged
them from further pursuing the claim.273 Fewer than ten days after the Safe
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC verdict, the Harvard
Square property owners in Crimson Galeria filed to dismiss with prejudice
all pending claims voluntarily.274 Although no longer pending, Crimson
Galeria was perhaps the boldest of the RICO-based claims due to the scope
and nature of the alleged injuries and damages.
In Crimson Galeria, property owners in the Harvard Square area of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, initiated civil RICO proceedings against the
operators of a marijuana cultivation facility and a proposed retail dispensary
in late 2017.275 The complaint asserted the distasteful conditions marijuana
businesses bring to neighborhoods including foul odors, undesirable
populations, and criminal activity that adversely affects property values and
the ability to find suitable renters.276 Initially, the complaint included claims
against state and local officials who licensed the operations.277 The court
unsurprisingly dismissed those claims because the plaintiffs in Crimson
Galeria, like those in Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, lacked a
substantive right to enforce the CSA and could “[]not invoke the [c]ourt’s
equitable power through this lawsuit.”278
The Harvard Square property owners claimed increased difficulty in
attracting buyers or renters and the inability to obtain financing for a
proposed expansion of a property due to the marijuana activities in the
neighborhood.279 To prove their injuries, the plaintiffs relied heavily on
experts such as a licensed real estate appraiser.280 The appraiser compared
272. Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20, 32 (D.
Mass. 2018).
273. See Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Crimson Galeria, No.
1:17-cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2018).
274. Id.
275. Crimson Galeria, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 26–27.
276. Complaint at 10, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17-cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Sept. 7,
2017).
277. Crimson Galeria, 337 F. Supp. 3d. at 34.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 29.
280. Id.
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the “stigma” of association with the marijuana activities to that of
association with “a drug and alcohol treatment center or groundwatercontaminated property” and estimated the loss of value of $18,785,000 plus
an additional $8,290,000 in lost profits.281 The Harvard Square property
owners initiated the action before the proposed retail facility opened in
December 2017 and later amended their complaint after the facility
opened.282
On October 5, 2018, the Harvard Square property owners filed an
amended complaint against the remaining defendants.283 The Harvard
Square property owners alleged injury to their property of approximately
$29,064,200 as a result of the medical marijuana patients illegally selling
their legally acquired marijuana on the property owners’ premises in
addition to the associated odor, traffic, and noise caused by the marijuana
operation.284 The remaining defendants included Healthy Pharms, Inc.;
Timbuktu Real Estate, LLC; 3 Brothers Real Estate, LLC; two individuals
with ownership interests in the three businesses; and Century Bank, which
provided financing for Timbuktu.285 The amended complaint alleged
multiple violations of the RICO statute and nuisance claims as well as a
request for declaratory judgment.286
The amended complaint also addressed weaknesses related to proximate
cause that were evident in the court’s treatment of the initial complaint.287
For example, the Harvard Square property owners emphasized the “open
and ongoing” federal crimes as causing depressed market values and
making the area less attractive to customers, renters, and potential buyers.288
The complaint alleged the marijuana operation’s enterprise produced loud
noises, impacted traffic, affected the safety of the area, and introduced
undesirable odors.289
To prove damages, the Harvard Square property owners again offered an
expert real estate appraiser who believed the marijuana enterprise had
“substantially diminished” the value of the Harvard Square property
281. Id. Note that a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs would yield treble damages making
the potential reward significant. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
282. Crimson Galeria, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 30.
283. First Amended Complaint at 1, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17-cv-11696-ADB (D.
Mass. Oct. 5, 2018).
284. Id. at 4.
285. Id. at 5–7.
286. Id. at 44–52.
287. Id. at 34–44.
288. Id. at 34.
289. Id.
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owner’s property making it difficult to find appropriate renters and buyers
and reducing available financing for legitimate businesses in the area.290
The Harvard Square property owners also alleged that the dispensary’s
patrons were carrying out illegal drug transactions on the their property and
provided photographic proof.291 As a result of the marijuana operations, the
Harvard Square property owners experienced slowed development of
residential units and banks provided less financing in spite of a normally
robust market in the area.292 Experts presented by the Harvard Square
property owners included an economist, noise consultants, and traffic
specialists.293 In addition, the Harvard Square property owners had tangible
economic losses—reduced financing for planned projects—to support their
claims of injury.294
The Crimson Galeria property owners abandoned their claims in
November 2018, within weeks of the pro-marijuana operation verdict in
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, although the
property owners appeared to be better-situated than many of the other
potential plaintiffs across the nation.295 Crimson Galeria involved an
enormous sum of money, especially if tripled for RICO-based damages,
experts in multiple fields, and evidence of the marijuana directly affecting
established businesses in the Cambridge area.296 The quick demise of
Crimson Galeria, especially so close to the marijuana operation’s victory in
Colorado, may indicate that the use of RICO to combat state-sanctioned
marijuana operations is not likely to succeed in court.297
V. Evaluating the Harvest: Lessons for Potential Claimants
While circumstances may arise that perfectly situate a property owner to
use RICO to combat state-sanctioned marijuana activity, the RICO cases
indicate that most property owners are unlikely to succeed.298 For those
290. Id. at 35–36.
291. Id. at 36, 41–43.
292. Id. at 36.
293. Id. at 37–39.
294. Id. at 37.
295. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2018).
296. First Amended Complaint at 1, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17-cv-116969-ADB (D.
Mass. Oct. 5, 2018).
297. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2018).
298. See supra Part IV.
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who believe they may be perfectly situated, the current RICO cases provide
some insight into the obstacles that property owners must overcome.299 As
demonstrated by Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC,
the issue of establishing a RICO violation for the cultivation, production, or
sale of marijuana is likely to be one for which there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, which means the issue may result in summary judgment. 300
As the Tenth Circuit explained, “Marijuana is a controlled substance under
the CSA. So the manufacture, distribution, and sale of that substance is, by
definition, racketeering activity under RICO.” 301 Proving injury to business
or property, and causation between the racketeering activity and that injury
pose greater challenges.302
As the RICO cases demonstrate, the alleged injury to property or
business caused by state-sanctioned marijuana operations will likely be tied
to nuisances created by odors associated with marijuana operations and the
diminution of property value based on proximity to a criminal enterprise.
However, property owners may not recover for “emotional, personal, or
speculative future injuries.”303 While recovery may be available for
infringing on the use and enjoyment of the land, property owners bringing
claims under RICO must tie their damages to the value of the property.
During the pleading stages, property owners may not have to provide
experts to prove that their property value is diminished. However, Safe
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC and Crimson Galeria
show that experts attesting to the value of the property both before and after
the marijuana operation commenced will be critical to success beyond the
pleading stage.304 In some jurisdictions, such as Oregon and California,
property owners will likely have to show that they sold property, rented it,
or attempted to do so at a lower value than before the marijuana operation
commenced. However, many property owners take legal action because
they want to preserve their properties without being subjected to a state299. See supra Part IV.
300. Order Re: Summary Judgment Motions at 8, Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing,
LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2018) (“Because the cultivation and
sale of marijuana remain illegal under the CSA, there can be no genuine dispute of material
fact that defendants’ activities meet the statutory definition of racketeering activity.”).
301. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 965, 884 (10th Cir. 2017).
302. See Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 15-CV-00349-REB-SKC, 2018
WL 3861156, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2018).
303. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 888–89.
304. First Amended Complaint at 1, Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms,
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2018); Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, 2018
WL 3861156, at *1.
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sanctioned marijuana operation, which means they are unlikely to want to
sell the property.
Proving injury to business will also be difficult because such losses are
often speculative. Quillinan and Crimson Galeria illustrate these
challenges.305 In Quillinan, the dispossession of a rented storage space was
insufficient to allege injury to business because the injury was of the type
that could have occurred with any change in building ownership.306 The
Harvard Square property owners in Crimson Galeria had a stronger claim
based on banks reducing lines of credit.307 However, even the Harvard
Square property owners in Crimson Galeria ultimately determined that
pursuing the case was not worthwhile.308 The fact that legalized
marijuana—especially recreational use—often results in increased property
values for land suitable for producing or selling marijuana also makes
injury to property difficult to prove.309
A simplistic reading of RICO creates the impression that proving the
elements of a RICO claim only requires proving that the marijuana
operation violated the statute by engaging in racketeering activity and that
activity injured property. However, Holmes stated otherwise by requiring
proximate cause as an additional element of a § 1964 RICO claim by a
private actor.310 As a result, property owners must prove both an injury to
property or business and that the criminal activity caused the injury. 311 The
property owners in Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing,
LLC failed to show proximate cause, and the property owners in McCart
likely would have failed had the case not been settled—as was illustrated by
the court’s dismissal in Bokaie.312 Ainsworth, which is closely related to

305. Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20, 32 (D.
Mass. 2018); Quillinan v. Ainsworth, No. 4:17-cv-00077-KAW, 2018 WL 2151936, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018).
306. Quillinan, 2018 WL 2151936, at *5.
307. Crimson Galeria, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 29.
308. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2018).
309. See, e.g., Art Carden, Legalizing Pot Sales Means . . . Higher Home Values?,
FORBES (July 17, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/artcarden/2018/07/17/
legalizing-pot-sales-means-higher-home-values/#13d5326b7e8f.
310. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
311. Id.
312. See supra Section IV.B; Bokaie v. Green Earth Coffee, L.L.C., No. 18-cv-0524JST, 2018 WL 6813212, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 20187). See Final Judgment at 1, Reilly v.
6480 Pickney, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC (D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2018).
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McCart, also failed to prove the marijuana operation reduced property
values and caused injury to property.313
RICO gives litigants access to federal courts under federal question
jurisdiction;314 however, RICO does not protect a plaintiff from facing a
potentially pro-marijuana jury. Marijuana legalization is becoming
increasingly popular among the public,315 and states that have legalized
marijuana have often done so in response to populist efforts. Convincing a
jury that a state-sanctioned marijuana operation creates such a nuisance that
it damages one’s ability to enjoy property or reduces its value is a daunting
task—especially in areas like Colorado where property values have
increased dramatically following legalization.316 The property owners in
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC could not
convince a jury that the marijuana producers caused the injury. 317
Moreover, Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC may
have led the Harvard Square property owners in Crimson Galeria to
dismiss their complaint because they would have faced similar issues in
Massachusetts, which began permitting recreational marijuana sales in
November 2018.318 The jury verdict in Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative
Holistic Healing, LLC will likely reduce the number of RICO-based claims
targeting state-sanctioned marijuana operations.
Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper also demonstrates that RICO is not
a useful tool to prevent states or local governments from legalizing
marijuana.319 Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper initially included equity
claims against the State of Colorado and a county government that alleged
injury to property by licensing the marijuana operation.320 The Tenth
313. Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 617-cv-01935-MC, 2019 WL 1387681, at *2 (D. Or.
Mar. 27, 2019).
314. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
315. Hannah Hartig & A.W. Geiger, About Six-in-Ten Americans Support Marijuana
Legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/10/08/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ (“The share of U.S. adults who
support marijuana legalization is little changed from about a year ago—when 61% favored
it—but it is double what it was in 2000 (31%).”).
316. Carden, supra note 309.
317. Final Judgment at 1, Reilly, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC (D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2018).
318. Nik DeCosta-Klipa, What to Know Before Visiting the New Recreational Marijuana
Dispensaries in Massachusetts, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.boston.com/
news/local-news/2018/09/21/massachusetts-marijuana-dispensaries-how-to-buy (reporting
an increase of six percent per home in Colorado since legalization); see also Elias, supra
note 194.
319. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 877 (10th Cir. 2017).
320. Id.
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Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked “any federal substantive rights”
as to the state and county and upheld dismissal of the claims.321 Efforts to
use RICO against the state and local government also failed in Crimson
Galeria with the dismissal of a preemption claim.322
However, the RICO cases demonstrate yet another reason why the
federal government needs to address marijuana’s inclusion in the
Controlled Substances Act. As more states legalize marijuana for either
medical or recreational use, problems related to banking, taxation,
employment, and criminal law continue to escalate. Landowners’ ability to
utilize federal racketeering laws to attack what some states consider a
legitimate business adds another layer of complication. The availability of
RICO as a tool for landowners may needlessly create dissension between
neighbors, expenses in the form of legal fees, and time-wasting federal
litigation. Allowing state and local governments to regulate marijuana
production based on local needs would best resolve these issues.
VI. Conclusion
In the wake of Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC,
Oklahoma property owners face a daunting challenge when using RICO to
pursue claims based on odor-related nuisances or decreased property value
due to proximity to a criminal enterprise. Most property owners are likely
limited to private nuisance claims in state court and working with state and
local governments to establish sufficiently protective regulatory schemes.
However, a perfect storm of injury and proximate cause could make RICO
an incredibly effective tool for an aggrieved property owner in Oklahoma.
Imagine, perhaps, a marijuana operation’s waste disposal processes damage
a neighbor’s crops or livestock. If the aggrieved property owner could
prove that the marijuana operation proximately caused “clear and definite”
injury to his property or business, she could recover treble damages and
attorney’s fees under RICO.
Marci J. Gracey

321. Id.
322. Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20, 32 (D.
Mass. 2018).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/7

